become the idiom of choice to distinguish between different orders of policy intervention, between those which are deemed to lack a positive change dynamic and leave basic conditions much as before; and those which introduce changes that are expected to result in positive effects because they tackle some of the factors that prevent change 5 .
In terms of social protection the common distinction between transformative and nontransformative interventions can be summed up as between those providing palliative measures that smooth over the effects of poverty (for example simple cash transfers or food aid programmes); and those that aim to enhance the potential of poor people to move out of poverty (for example by investing in their capabilities, changing their behaviour, and helping them to overcome disabling/oppressive social relations). Whether the expected changes occur, and if they do, whether they are the result of these programmes, and whether they have lasting effects, are of course based on theoretical assumptions but they are also empirical questions on which only longitudinal data would be able settle 6 . In the meantime, a body of 5 Of course all interventions have effects so there is much scope for disagreement, depending on the theory and evidence offered over whether the changes are significant or not. 6 For one of the few studies of CT effects on social mobility see Sandberg, 2012. research is emerging which has begun to cast some tentative light on how change dynamics might occur and in what measure.
Innovations in CT design
As CT programmes have evolved over time there have been some positive changes to their design. Some are explicit it aiming to go beyond the basic safety net approach and have begun to incorporate elements aiming to develop beneficiaries' skills and knowledge through training and awareness-raising 7 . More attention too has been paid to treating the causes of poverty and vulnerability as multidimensional which has led in some cases to more gender-aware programming (Holmes and Jones. 2013) . Latin America's cash transfers were the first to include human development conditionalities that required children to attend school and health checks. These (or the simple fact of having the cash) have resulted in improvements in children's nutritional levels and child attendance at school and health clinics (Fitzbein and Schady, 2009) , although success in meeting their objectives can be undermined by poor quality schooling and health provision (Morley and Coady, 2003; Reiners et al., 2005) ), while fulfilling the conditionalities has imposed sometimes onerous burdens on the beneficiary mothers (Molyneux, 2006; Bradshaw, 2008; Benderley, 2011; Gammage, 2011) . However in some initiatives, such as Mexico's Prospera (formerly Oportunidades), beneficiaries are increasingly offered employment training and income-generating opportunities, as well as being provided with subsidised childcare through the Estancias subsidised crèche scheme (Holmes and Jones, 2012) . Similar complementary services exist in Brazil's Bolsa Familia programme (Fultz and Francis 2013).
Participation and citizenship in Social Protection
A different order of innovation in CT programme design involves measures that promote beneficiary rights, citizenship and participation. While the first generation of CTs were, as some saw it, merely managing poverty or even depoliticizing the condition of poverty, the more recent programmes have increasingly also been designed to 'empower' poor people by promoting citizen voice and participation through social accountability and social audits.
In contrast to other areas of development practice (such as environmental management and rural development projects) social protection programmes were slow to include participatory elements of any kind. However the last decade has seen a growing momentum in the inclusion of participatory processes in social protection programmes. This has been in large part spurred by pressures to make their administration more efficient as programmes designed for the poor have often been prone to poor delivery and corruption, with service personnel overloaded, poorly trained, underpaid and lacking in motivation because of the limits placed on their own capacities to bring about system change (Pellissery, 2010; RoseAckerman, 2004; Shah and Schacter, 2004) . Social accountability as an idea and set of practices involving the direct participation of beneficiaries and stakeholders, was first officially endorsed for social protection programmes in the 2004 World Development Report, Making
Services Work for Poor People (World Bank, 2004) . This identified the lack of accountability mechanisms as the primary cause of service delivery failures. Noting that the 'long route' to accountability through public officials and elections did not serve the poor, it advocated 'shorter routes' or 'chains of accountability' to be put in place at meso and micro levels, enabling direct accountability between users and providers. By increasing stakeholders voice, and introducing principles of transparency, communities could not only regularly monitor service provision but were also entitled to expect responses to suggestions, complaints and abuses.
CTs have recently begun to include social accountability elements and some of these align with the 'transformation' agenda. In addition to tackling oppressive social relations and forms of exclusion, mechanisms designed to promote voice, rights and justice values are being embedded in programming. In giving more voice to programme beneficiaries, and more rights to participate, claim and complain, a change dynamic is incorporated into CT programme design which some argue may empower the poor and foster collective identity and action (Corbridge et al., 2005 ).
At the most basic level, social accountability involves establishing grievance channels and creating greater transparency in programme management; but it also extends to using techniques of community or participatory monitoring and evaluation (PM&E), along with newer tools such as community score cards. When these work well they serve to gain valuable feedback from beneficiaries and other stakeholders about the quality and regularity of service As these authors emphasise, any effects that occur at the meso-level will be shaped to some degree by the nature of the communities concerned, and how they are governed, whether for example, by village elders whose authority is sanctioned by appeals to customs and norms, or those in which the decentralization of power and resources has been brought about by legislative processes effected through local government and administrative institutions. has a civic culture that has, over twenty years developed both the institutions and experience of participatory governance. Citizens, including the poorest are aware that they can make political demands and that they have a right to hold power-holders to account.
Borges Sugiyama finds however that while participatory spaces exist, community level engagement is hampered both by a lack of appropriate institutional arenas in which Bolsa
Família beneficiaries are represented, and by their belief that the councils and collaborative spaces that exist, are not truly available to them for participation, monitoring, and accountability. Nevertheless, the programme did benefit from, and was responsive to, certain monitoring mechanisms such as fiscal transparency, which along with other governmentinstigated accountability procedures, allowed the media and interest groups to investigate and report poor management and suspected wrongdoing. Social accountability was therefore assured in this case by top-down measures that were incorporated into the administration of the programme, rather than by the active participation by beneficiaries.
These findings underscore a widely acknowledged view that programmes which rely solely on beneficiary participation to ensure accountability risk failure particularly in the very deprived social contexts that are precisely the ones served by anti poverty programmes (Fox, 2013, 10 As Gupta has argued in his analysis of Indian anti-poverty programmes, if these have no links to political processes they can serve to 'shore up the legitimacy of ruling regimes' (Gupta 2012: 278) . Mansuri and Rao, 2013, Engberg-Pedersen and Webster, 2002: 255-271; McGee and Norton, 2000) . Where extreme poverty and social exclusion prevail, the scope for active and independent engagement is often limited as the most vulnerable are not always able or willing to provide feedback on programmes, let alone complain to higher authorities, often fearing reprisals. In these circumstances, closer attention to administrative forms of accountability to secure transparency and ensure the proper procedures and conduct of officials is especially necessary.
Jones Recent research by Hickey and King has engaged the broader issue of how welfare programmes might affect state-citizen relations in those programmes that encourage more sustained engagement between citizens and service providers, for instance through large scale social audits 11 . Hickey and King's article for this issue reviews over ninety studies in the social accountability field aims to identify the underpinnings of 'citizenship empowerment'. Like
Borges Sugiyama, they find that there has been a misplaced technocratic over-emphasis on bottom-up accountability mechanisms, and point to a common failure in ignoring how contextual factors, power dynamics and incentive structures affect outcomes. These problems tend to be greatest in contexts of limited political will, or weak institutional infrastructure, including poor data collection and monitoring systems, under-investment in staff capacities, and lack of reliable citizen's channels.
They emphasise the importance of creating synergies between upward and downward forms of accountability, but above all call for greater attention to be paid by policymakers to the specific characteristics of civil society, political society and state-society relations, and the interplay between them. These together determine the likely efficacy of social accountability programme interventions. Social protection in aid dependent countries also tends to be driven by external agencies which limits the opportunities for strengthening the social contract between the state and its citizens and inhibits the emergence of coalitions across different social groups who collectively may be better placed to hold the state to account.
Hickey and King see the success of social accountability as dependent on the ways that programmes are implemented, with attention to proactively engendering social belonging and political voice. But while there have been some recent if still fledgling attempts to strengthen opportunities for voice and engagement between citizens and service providers in cash transfer programmes, they argue that so far cash transfer debates have side-lined the broader issues of politics and power. Analysts and policy makers alike need to pay more attention to factors such as whether or not there is political will to actively support these initiatives, whether institutionalised political parties exist, whether human resources and bureaucratic capacity are adequate to the task, and whether civil society has the capacity to mobilise and form strategic alliances. All these shape the possibilities for fostering active citizenship and the ability to hold power holders to account.
A realistic appreciation of the highly contingent and political character of social accountability therefore suggests that for all the benefits that it can bring to beneficiaries, there are still formidable obstacles in the way of 'empowering' the poor including inadequate political, administrative and financial support. Positive outcomes also depend on efficient administration and attention to underlying structural conditions such as entrenched power relations that may limit the ability of social protection interventions to serve as conduits to citizenship (Hickey and Mohan, 2008) .
Conclusions
The shifting of social protection programming parameters away from a narrow focus on tackling income poverty towards promoting broader positive changes has begun to deliver some positive, if as yet inconclusive and mixed results. The articles in this Special Issue show that CTPs have the potential to generate a variety of change processes, from small shifts in people's subjective dispositions to collective engagement with public policymaking. While beneficiaries of these programmes view cash transfers as an essential component of their coping repertoires, there is evidence that they also tend to increase their sense of self-worth, dignity, and their assertiveness. As a result of gaining some economic security CT recipients report that this has afforded them a degree more financial independence and control over their lives. An awareness of rights and entitlements can also embolden beneficiaries to challenge unacceptable behaviour by officials and make collective demands. At the community (meso-) level, a positive impact on social relations was evidenced where transfers enabled poor households' engagement in religious, family and social events. This formation of bonding social capital could in some contexts and with NGO support, also lead to horizontal solidarity between beneficiaries over issues that concerned them.
However, in regard to the more ambitious objectives of social protection -ensuring that propoor policies are responsive to a broader definition of poor people's needs, are accountable to them and foster active citizenship -the evidence suggests more modest achievements.
Three points stand out: first, any improvements in well-being and self confidence as may accompany CT programmes have no necessary consequences for citizenship action and hence for politics; second, the circuits that connect programme level activities and the wider spheres of politics and policy appear to be weakly articulated and are not systematically embedded in social protection; third, without robust regulatory mechanisms to ensure representation and transparency, even a culture of grassroots activity and citizen awareness can be ineffective in securing accountability. Nonetheless in some contexts social accountability mechanisms do appear to have helped reduce corruption, improve service quality and empower people (Claasen & Alpín-Lardiés, 2010; The evidence offered by Hickey and Borges-Sugiyama suggests that while voice and participation have long been acknowledged as important elements within development practice, meaningful social accountability cannot rely solely upon participatory mechanisms and must take into account the broader political economy and institutional dynamics at play.
Without greater attention to these factors, and without establishing the means to provide adequate and accessible information systems, feedback loops and monitoring and evaluation procedures, there will be limited scope for individuals, households and communities to have their needs and priorities heard and responded to.
Finally, securing transformative social protection is resource-and time-intensive, particularly given the need for careful contextualisation in terms of geography, political systems, decentralisation structures and conflict/post-conflict-related dynamics. Indeed, findings from some of the case studies profiled in this special issue make the point that progress towards this goal is unlikely to be linear given the complexities of the political environments in which programmers are working. Broader structural obstacles also stand in the way of achieving transformative results from these programmes. Economic crises and fiscal deficits set up financial barriers to taking programmes to the scale needed; investment in longer-term processes may be discouraged, including in those required to empower citizens and strengthen capacities of service providers. There is therefore some way to go if social protection programmes are to do more than offer some respite from destitution for the poorest and realise the promise held out by 'transformative' social protection.
